



Russia's Information Campaign Against Ukraine

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EST Defence Forces

Deputy director

NATO StratCom COE


Vilnius, Lithuania

21 November 2014



Presentation outline


1. Aim of the analysis
2. Context of the Information Campaign
3. Execution of the Information Campaign
4. Russia's strategic narratives
5. Strong and weak points of the Campaign
6. Conclusions





Aim of the Analysis

- Analyse the Russia's information campaign against Ukraine **from the strategic communications perspective** - from the EU Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius (NOV 2013) to the annexation of Crimea (MAR 2014)
- Analyse the **methods** used for execution of the campaign, its **strengths and weaknesses**





Context

«The breakup of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century»


(V.Putin)





Context (cont.)

- Russia's information campaign against Ukraine has to be viewed in the context of the **developments within Russia during the past 15 years** resulting in centralization of power and increased state control over media
- Supportive policy documents: **Foreign Policy Review (2007), State Security Strategy (2009)**





General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff

- Military action starts by groups of troops during peacetime (war is not declared at all).
- Non-contact clashes between highly maneuverable interspecific fighting groups.
- Annihilation of the enemy's military and economic power by short-time precise strikes in strategic military and civilian infrastructure.
- Massive use of high-precision weapons and special operations, robotics, and weapons that use new physical principles (direct-energy weapons – lasers, shortwave radiation, etc.)
- Use of armed civilians (4 civilians to 1 military).
- Simultaneous strike on the enemy's units and facilities in all of the territory.
- Simultaneous battle on land, air, sea, and in the informational space.



Information Campaign Execution

- Narrative Control
- Audience Segmentation



Kremlin

- Foreign Policy Review (2007)
- Security Strategy (2009)

- Weekly meetings
- Personnel
- Budget

- Restrictions
- Control over personnel
- Public figures
- "Troll farms"

- Compatriot organisations
- Other NGOs
- Experts

- UN
- OSCE
- EP



TV



Social media



NGO




IO

Synchronised messaging based on narratives
Massive falsification


Messaging
Community
Mobilisation
Funding

Initiatives
Resolutions


Closure of
Ukrainian TV
channels in Crimea




Ukraine



Russia



Compatriots



Foreign countries

PSYOPS

THIS IS NOT DONBASS, UKRAINE


JuliaPGoncharova
 @JuliaPGoncharova

#savedonbaspeople #SaveDonbassPeople
pic.twitter.com/nixlm0iLtXX

Reply 53 Retweet 1 Favorite

3:45 PM - 27 May 2014



IT'S AN IMAGE FROM A FEATURE FILM


FILM FESTIVAL
23.06 - 02.07.2011

[News](#) [Accreditation](#) [Contacts](#) [MFF-TV](#)



press-release

Gala Screenings
The Best Fortress
 Брестская крепость
 Director, **Aleksandr Kozl**
 Russia, Republic of Belarus, 2010; 120 min.
 Script Vladimir Eremkin, Aleksey Duzhnev, Konstantin Vorobyov, Ekaterina Trifonova (original idea by Igor Ugodnikov)
 Camera Vladimir Bashta
 Production design Alim Malvejchuk
 Music Yuri Krasavin
 General producer Igor Ugodnikov
 Producers Igor Ugodnikov, Ruben Dzhundzhunyan, Vladimir Zaremboin

PSYOPS

**ЭТА ДЕВОЧКА НЕ БЫЛА УБИТА
УКРАИНСКИМИ ВОЕННЫМИ
В СЛАВЯНСКЕ**

ОНА ПОГИБЛА В КРЫМУ В 2013



**РАСКАЖИ МНЕ СВИДОМЫЙ
ЗА ЧТО ТВОЯ АРМИЯ УБИЛА ЭТУ ДЕВОЧКУ
19.06.2014 В СЛАВЯНСКЕ?
РАСКАЖИ! НЕ СТЕСНЯЙСЯ!**

**Распространите этот призыв,
поставив "КЛАСС".
Пусть увидит весь мир это фото!
В этом нет ничего классного, но это единственный способ в
одноклассниках распространить информацию!**



PSYOSP





OPSEC




solutions mapping
interaction
lessons learned
state
procedu
exp
value
state
help

Presence



EXCELLENCE

solutions mapping
interaction
lessons learned



Posture



Profile

Before



In Georgia



Ukraine, Crimea



EXCELLENCE
solutions mapping
interaction
lessons learned
system
procedu
exp
mission
help

Deception

THIS IS NOT DONBASS, UKRAINE

IT'S BOSNIA



#SaveDonbassFromUkraineArmy

The Tigers, a Serbian paramilitary group, took the young bodies of the Croat Muslims to be killed in the war in Bosnia. Spring 1992

Photo © 2001 Rex Media / AP

an doctrine alliance
 solutions mapping
 interaction
 EXCELLENCE
 solutions mapping
 interaction
 state
 procedu
 exp
 values
 create
 help

Deception

ЭТО НЕ УКРАИНА В 2014

ЭТО ЧЕЧНЯ В 1995



Novorossiya Rises
@Novorossiyan

Death in #Ukraine.
pic.twitter.com/FJnVn5MvoO



"War in Chechnya. Grozny, Chechnya, 1995." by Peter Turnley

Deception

ЭТО НЕ НАЦГВАРДЕЕЦ

ЭТО РЕКВИЗИТ В ФИЛЬМУ "МЫ ИЗ БУДУЩЕГО", СОЗДАТЕЛЬ РЕКВИЗИТА ДЕЛАЕТ ШУТЛИВЫЕ ФОТО С НИМ

Елена К. @Neringa205
 ДЛЯ ТРИБУНАЛА! @belvo! Бандеровцы-нацгв, пришедшие убивать ЮВосток, шлют домой такие фото. И они говорят о единой стране? pic.twitter.com/VGv3Qzj8uf

from Калининград, Калининград

Reply Retweet Favorite More




RETWEETS 750 FAVORITES 16




4:16 PM - 5 Jun 2014

Flag media



EW - Electronical warfare




Physical destruction



Key leader engagement

RUSSIAN TV CLAIMED RIGHT SECTOR
 PARTY LEADER DMYTRO YAROSH
 WAS LEADING IN ELECTION POLL RESULTS

POROSHENKO WAS LEADING
 IN REAL POLL RESULTS WITH 55.9%,
 YAROSH RECEIVED 0.9%



EXCELLENCE
 solutions mapping
 interaction
 doctrine alliance
 plan options
 social media
 data collaboration
 mission NATO STRATCOM





Key leader engagement



Computer network operations, cyber war



solutions mapping
interaction
stater
procedu
exp
help


Civil Military Cooperations





Strategic narratives

- Ukrainians are not an independent nation. They are part of Russian world
- Ukraine is nazi state, populated with banderovtsi. Great War against fascist continues.
- West is divided
- Russian actions are legitimate





Strengths of Russia's information campaign

- **Right timing:** vacuum of power in Kyiv, West reluctant to involve by military means
- **Long-term preparation:** readiness to conduct the new type of warfare (lessons-learned from previous conflicts), policy and legal documents in place
- **Strategic C2:** effective use of power vertical, narrative control in media (incl. falsification), use of strategic communications (incl. military component)
- **Use of «Compatriots policy» as a tool of influence:** maintenance of common information space
- **Knowledge of target audiences:** ability to manipulate with the values, needs, historic memory, emotions of the target audience
- **Deception:** massive use of deception to mislead adversary and gain more time (case of MH17)



Weaknesses of Russia's information campaign


- **Disinformation campaigns erode over time** – but they can be rather successful in short term
- **Say-do gap and inconsistency in messages** : public denial of military intervention despite obvious proof of Western media, no promised Paradise in Crimea, half-empty humanitarian aid convoy; contradicting messages of Kremlin and separatists (*Novorossiya* Youtube channel).
- **Inability to control social media**: even with increased state attempts to control Internet media, it works well to reveal fake information and provide alternatives. Example of Russian soldiers' posts in social media.
- **Poor assessment of western reactions**: Russian aggression has mobilised and united the Western democracies, NATO, EU, its reputation is damaged, Ukraine likely to become a long-term enemy.





Conclusions

- Communication capabilities as soft power in modern war are playing important role before and during crisis.
- Russian narratives are based on historical memory and they are persistent.
- Crisis in Ukraine is result of Russia's long term strategy
- Compatriots abroad will be used as tool to fulfil fatherland ambitions
- Deception is used by Russia as tactic to distract and delay.
- Disinformation campaigns erode over time. Truth will win.





Questions?

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